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A New Fiscal Rule :, Should Israel “Go Swiss?”, Steven Symansky, Xavier Debrun, Natan Epstein

Label
A New Fiscal Rule :, Should Israel “Go Swiss?”, Steven Symansky, Xavier Debrun, Natan Epstein
Language
eng
Abstract
We propose a fiscal rule that fulfills a specific debt reduction objective while maintaining significant fiscal flexibility-two overarching concerns in Israel. Not unlike the Swiss "debt brake," the rule incorporates an error-correction mechanism (ECM) through which departure from the debt objective affects binding medium-run expenditure ceilings. Two variants of our ECM rule are shown to be superior to a comparable deficit rule in terms of attaining the debt objective and allowing for fiscal stabilization while supporting medium-term expenditure planning. Given its relative sophistication, a proper implementation of the ECM rule requires supportive fiscal institutions, including independent input and assessment
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
resource.governmentPublication
international or intergovernmental publication
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
A New Fiscal Rule :
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Responsibility statement
Steven Symansky, Xavier Debrun, Natan Epstein
Series statement
IMF Working Papers
Sub title
Should Israel “Go Swiss?”
Table Of Contents
Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Rules in Israel-Historical Context; Figures; 1. General Government Finances, 1980-2006; 2. International Comparison: General Government Finances, 2003-06; III. Recent International Experience; A. The Growing Appetite for Fiscal Rules; Tables; 1. Central Government: DRL Ceiling Versus Actual Deficits, 1992-2009; 2. International Comparison of Fiscal Rules; B. Flows, Stocks, and the Rule's Ultimate Objective; IV. A New Fiscal Rule for Israel-A Debt Brake Approach; A. A Swiss-Like Error Correction Mechanism; 3. Scenario Analysis One, 2009-17B. An Expenditure Rule with a Debt FeedbackC. Comparing the Proposed Rules: Hitting the Debt Target While Preserving Automatic Stabilization; 3. Comparative Performance of Alternative Fiscal Rules for Israel, 2010-15; 4. Simulated Debt Path Under Various Fiscal Rules, 2009-17; V. Institutional Considerations; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; Algebra for the Debt-Feedback Expenditure Rule; References
Classification
Content
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