European Parliament Library

Auction Format Matters :, Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue, Robert Feldman, Vincent Reinhart

Label
Auction Format Matters :, Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue, Robert Feldman, Vincent Reinhart
Language
eng
Abstract
This paper evaluates the importance of auction format on bidding behavior and seller revenue, focusing on differences in performance under uniform-price and discriminatory-price formats. The analysis is based on a standard benchmark model from which empirically-testable hypotheses are derived on the optimal amount of bid shading that generates revenue equivalence between the two formats. Applying this model to data from the IMF gold auctions run in 1976-80, we find evidence of statistically significant shading in excess of the theoretically-derived optimum under the discriminatory format. This evidence suggests greater seller revenue under the uniform-price format
resource.governmentPublication
international or intergovernmental publication
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
Auction Format Matters :
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Responsibility statement
Robert Feldman, Vincent Reinhart
Series statement
IMF Working Papers
Sub title
Evidenceon Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue
Content
Other version