European Parliament Library

Welfare economics and antitrust policy, Richard S. Markovits, Volume II

Label
Welfare economics and antitrust policy, Richard S. Markovits, Volume II
Language
eng
Index
no index present
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
Welfare economics and antitrust policy
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Responsibility statement
Richard S. Markovits
Table Of Contents
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Part IIThe Morally-Relevant Effects of Specific Categories of Antitrust-Policy-Coverable Conduct and the Ability of Government to Secure Better Outcomes (Continued) -- 11 Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions -- 11.1 The 16 Ways in Which Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s Can Increase Their Participants' Profits -- 11.1.1 The 8 "Sherman-Act-Licit" Ways in Which Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s Can Increase Their Participants' Profits-That Is, Can Do So Without Increasing Those Profits by Reducing the Absolute Attractiveness of the Most-Attractive Offers Against Which They Will Have to Compete in a Way That Would Render the (M or A) Profitable Even If It Would Have Been Economically Inefficient in an oPp Economy -- 11.1.2 The 8 Sherman-Act-Illicit Ways in Which a Horizontal (M or A) Can Increase Its Participants' Profits -- 11.2 The Determinants of the Amount of Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Will Yield Its Participants in Each of the 16 Ways in Which It Can Yield Them Profits, the Relationship Between Each of These 16 Profit-Yields and the (M or A)'s Associated Impact on Economic Efficiency, the Relevance of the Fact That a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants Profits in Each of the 16 Ways in Which It Can Do So to the (M or A)'s Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness, and the Relevance of the Fact That a Horizo -- 11.2.1 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Marginal-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates -- 11.2.2 Analyses That Relate to Any Static Fixed-Cost Efficiencies a Horizontal (M or A) Generates -- 11.2.3 Analyses That Relate to Any Dynamic Efficiencies That a Horizontal (M or A) Generates11.2.4 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)'s Increasing Its Participants' Profits by Substituting for a Situation in Which No Participant Could Profit by Making a QV or PPR Investment Even Though at Least Two of Them Would Have Found Such an Investment Profitable If It Would Not Have Induced Another Participant to Make an Investment a Situation in Which the Resulting Firm Can Make One Such Investment Without Inducing Anyone to Make Another -- 11.2.5 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)'s Increasing Its Participants' Profits by Creating a Resulting Firm Whose Selection of the Investments It Will Make Is Influenced by the Alternative Investments' Impacts on the Profits Yielded by the Other Projects of All Participants -- 11.2.6 Analyses That Relate to a Horizontal (M or A)'s Increasing Its Participants' Profits or Equivalent-Dollar Gains by Enabling the Owner or Owner/Manager of One Participant to Liquidate His or Her Assets and Retire from Management -- 11.2.7 Analyses That Relate to the Equivalent-Dollar Gains a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Creating a Resulting Firm That Can Take Advantage of a Tax-Loss Incurred by a Participant That Could Not Use It as a Separate Entity -- 11.2.8 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)'s Yielding Its Participants Profits by Enabling Them (and Their Rivals) to Make Additional (Jointly-Profitable) Expenditures on Political Campaigns/Parties/Candidates and Government-Decision-Making-Process Participation -- 11.2.9 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Increasing Their HNOPs by Freeing Them From Each Other's Price-Competition -- 11.2.10 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Freeing Them From Each Other's Investment-Competition11.2.11 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by Creating a Resulting Firm That Realizes More Profits by Driving Out Extant Rival Investors by Engaging in Predatory Pricing, Predatory Advertizing, or Making Other Predatory Moves Than the Participants Would Have Done as Separate Entities -- 11.2.12 Analyses That Relate to Any Profits a Horizontal (M or A) Yields Its Participants by (Predatorily) Critically Increasing the Retaliation Barrier to Entry Faced by an Otherwise-Effective Potential Competitor or the Retaliation Barrier to Expansion Faced by an Otherwise-Effective Established-Firm Potential Investment-Expander -- 11.2.13 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)'s Increasing Its Participants' Profits by Predatorily Inducing an Established Rival to Change the Product-Space Location of an Existing Investment or by Predatorily Inducing an Established Rival or Potential Entrant to Change the Product-Space Location of a New Investment (When the Location-Change Does Not Increase Economic Efficiency) -- 11.2.14 Analyses That Relate to Any Horizontal (M or A)'s Increasing Its Participants' Profits by Creating a Resulting Firm That Is Better Able Than the Participants Would Have Been to Increase Their and Their Mutual Rivals' Across-the Board HNOPs by Altering the Sequence in Which They and Their Mutual Rivals Announce and "Lock Themselves Into" Their Prices -- 11.3 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Horizontal (M or A)s and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.3.1 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s11.3.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding in Appropriate Ways to Proposed/Consummated Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.4 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s and the Ability of a Government to Instantiate Its Liberal Justice-Commitments by Responding Appropriately to Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.4.1 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.4.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Reduce the Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violations Firms Commit When Consummating Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s and Operating the Resulting Firms -- 11.5 The Impact of Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Governments to Instantiate These Various Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Proposed and Consummated Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.5.1 The Impact of Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good -- 11.5.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Serve the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Proposed and Consummated Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s -- 11.6 Conclusion -- References -- 12 Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions -- 12.1 The Differences in the Ways in Which Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s Can Yield Their Participants Profits and the Relationship Between the Determinants of the Magnitudes of the Impacts That Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s Will Have on Their Participants' Profits12.1.1 The Relevant Differences Between Conglomerate and Horizontal (M&amp -- A)s When Neither Participant Is an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other -- 12.1.2 The Relevance of One or Both Participants' Being an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other to the Profits That a Conglomerate (M or A) Yields Its Participants and the Determinants of the Impacts That a Conglomerate (M or A) Will Have on Its Participants' Profits by Virtue of One or More Participants' Being an Effective Potential Competitor of the Other in Various Situations -- 12.2 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Conglomerate (M or A)s and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&amp -- A)s -- 12.2.1 The Economic Efficiency of Particular Conglomerate (M or A)s -- 12.2.2 The Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Increase Economic Efficiency by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&amp -- A)s -- 12.3 The Liberal-Moral-Rights-Violativeness of Conglomerate (M or A)s and the Ability of a Government to Instantiate the Liberal Conception of Justice by Responding Appropriately to Proposed/Consummated Conglomerate (M&amp -- A)s -- 12.4 The Impact of Conglomerate (M&amp -- A)s on the Instantiation of the Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian-Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good and the Ability of a Liberal-Moral-Rights-Constrained Government to Instantiate These Egalitarian Conceptions of the Moral Good by Responding Appropriately to Conglomerate (M&amp -- A)s -- References -- 13 Surrogates for Vertical Integration -- 13.1 "Fancy" Pricing-Techniques -- 13.1.1 The Functions of Fancy Horizontal Pricing-Techniques13.1.2 The Economic Efficiency of Those Sellers' That Find It Profitable to Do So Substituting Each Fancy Pricing-Technique I Have Identified for Single Pricing and the Economic Efficiency of the Government's Deterring the Use of Each Such Type of Fancy Pricing-Technique
Classification
Content

Incoming Resources