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Leadership Contestability, Monopolistic Rents and Growth, Roberto Piazza

I construct an endogenous growth model where R&D is carried out at the industry level in a game of innovation between leaders and followers. Innovation costs for followers are assumed to increase with the technological lag from leaders. We obtain three results that contrast with standard Schumpeterian models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992). First, leaders may innovate in equilibrium, in an attempt to force followers out of the innovation game. Second, policies (such as patents) that allow for strong protections of monopolies can reduce the steady state growth rate of the economy. Third, multiple equilibria arise when monopolies' protection is large
Table Of Contents
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Technologies; A. Final Good Production; B. Intermediate Goods Production; C. Innovation Technology; III. Preferences; IV. The Innovation Problem for γ small; V. Equilibrium; A. Equilibrium Conditions for the Households; B. Equilibrium with No Monopolistic Innovation:; C. Equilibria with Monopolistic Innovation:; VI. Results; VII. Conclusions; Appendices; References; Footnotes
Literary Form
non fiction
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (43 p.)
Specific Material Designation
Form Of Item

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