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Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations, Luc Laeven, Ross Levine

Contributor
Abstract
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models
Table Of Contents
Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data; A. Control Rights and Types of Large Owners; B. Cash-Flow Rights; C. Valuations; III. Are Complex Ownership Structures Relevant?; A. Importance and Classification of Ownership Structures; B. Complex Ownership Patterns: Types and Firm Size; IV. Regression Results; A. Theoretical Framework and Econometric Specification; B. Estimation and Inference; C. Valuations and Complex Ownership Structures; V. Conclusions; Tables; 1. Summary Statistics of Tobin's Q; 2. Importance of Firms with Multiple Blockholders; 3. Tobin's Q by Ownership Category
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (39 p.)
Specific Material Designation
remote
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9781462351794

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