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Bidder Participation and Information in Currency Auctions, Rafael Romeu, Lawrence Ausubel

Abstract
This paper studies the participation and performance of sophisticated versus unsophisticated auction participants in an environment with numerous bidders, uncertainty, and asymmetric information. We examine multi-unit, pay-as-bid, currency auctions conducted by the Central Bank of Venezuela. We find that sophisticated bidders outperform their less sophisticated rivals during periods of high volatility, apparently as a result of their superior informationgathering ability. The result is consistent across both quantity (sophisticated bidders win more market share) and price (sophisticated bidders pay lower premiums). The result is consistent with the view that a pay-as-bid auction format may be detrimental to participation by less-informed bidders
Table Of Contents
""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. Some Institutional Details""; ""III. Methodology""; ""IV. Descriptive Statistics""; ""VI. Conclusion""; ""References""
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (46 p.)
Specific Material Designation
remote
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9781452746128

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