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Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation, Fabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum
Table Of Contents
Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential Regulation
Literary Form
non fiction
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (28 p.)
Specific Material Designation
Form Of Item

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