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Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships, André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth

There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered
Table Of Contents
Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References
Literary Form
non fiction
At head of title: Offices in Europe
Physical Description
1 online resource (25 p.)
Specific Material Designation
Form Of Item

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