European Parliament Library

Bank Bailouts :, Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella

Contributor
Abstract
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing “value effect” that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Physical Description
1 online resource (30 pages)
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9780128134573

Library Locations

  • EP Library Strasbourg

    7 Place Adrien Zeller, Allée du Printemps, Strasbourg, F-67070, FR
    Borrow
  • EP Library Brussels

    60 rue Wiertz, Brussels, B-1047, BE
    Borrow
  • EP Library Luxembourg

    Rue du Fort Thüngen, Luxembourg, L-1313, LU
    Borrow