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Public Disclosure and Bank Failures, Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella

Contributor
Abstract
This paper examines how public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure affects banks’ risk-taking incentives and assesses how the presence of informed depositors influences the soundness of the banking system. It finds that, when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolios, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Physical Description
1 online resource (25 pages)
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9781452732084

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