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Deficit Limits, Budget Rules, and Fiscal Policy, Paolo Manasse

Abstract
The paper presents a simple model for discussing the effects of deficit limits and budget rules on fiscal policy. I find that limits on deficit-output ratios provide incentives to implement procyclical policies when the economy is in intermediate states, and countercyclical policies only in very "good" and very "bad" economic times. As a result, fiscal "reaction functions" are not monotonically related to the state of the economy. Deficit limits are found to exert discipline only provided the limit is tight and the expected sanction large, albeit at a relatively large welfare cost. Moreover, when fiscal choices are made under a veil of ignorance about the output gap, an increase in volatility is likely to raise the level of the budget deficit. Finally, concerning the design of fiscal frameworks, when excessive deficits arise from a political bias, deficit limits should be symmetric and not state-contingent
Table Of Contents
""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF FISCAL POLICY""; ""III. DEFICIT LIMITS""; ""IV. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (20 p.)
Specific Material Designation
remote
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9786613825315

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