European Parliament Library

Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries :, Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy, Giorgio Brosio, Ehtisham Ahmad

Contributor
Abstract
A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective
Table Of Contents
Contents; I. Introduction; A. General Considerations; B. Systems of Revenue Sharing and Earmarking; II. Latin American Tax Systems and Tax Reforms; Tables; 1. Comparative Levels of Company and Personal Income Taxation, 2002; A. Trends in Revenue Assignments; B. The Dynamic Context: The Need for Hard Budget Constraints; 2. Assignment of Taxes in Latin America; C. Possible Tax Assignments; State-level VATs; D. Decentralized Taxation of Business with Direct VAT-Type Instruments; Specific production/consumption taxes; Property taxation; Personal income taxes; Rents from natural resources
Language
eng
Literary Form
non fiction
Note
Description based upon print version of record
Physical Description
1 online resource (29 p.)
Specific Material Designation
remote
Form Of Item
online
Isbn
9781452724874

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